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CRISIS COMPLIANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
BASED RISKS:
LESSONS FROM FUKUSHIMA
By Laura Lally and Brian Garbushian*

ABSTRACT
International Organizations require guidelines for dealing with Technology Based
Risk. This paper presents a framework for the role of technology in crises--Crisis
Compliance-the use of technology to predict crises, to prevent them from occurring, and to
prevail over the ones that do occur and extends it to international organizations and industries.
This framework is applied to the disaster at Fukushima and it explores the Japanese
government's role in deploying nuclear technology, responding to the immediate crisis, and
coordinating the massive ongoing cleanup effort. Five characteristics of the crisis emerge: 1)
"Design Basis" versus "Beyond Design Basis" Risks-what risks are "built-in" to nuclear
technologies versus those that are "outside the box," 2) Deterministic versus Stochastic
Risks-risks whose impact is immediately visible versus those risks whose effect are only
visible long term, 3) Physical and Geographical Scope-the degree to which the risk can be
physically isolated, 4) Contained versus Cascading Disasters-disasters of one particular type
versus those that evolve into other forms of disasters, and 5) Internal versus External Locus of
Control- industry's ability to regulate itself versus the need for independent regulatory
agencies. Application of this framework to other technology based crises provides further
examples of how an understanding of these characteristics can provide insight into dealing
with international Technology Based Risk in the future.
Keywords: Crisis Compliance, Crisis Management, Technology Based Risk,
Fukushima, High Reliability Organizations, Normal Accident Theory, Target and Shield
Model.

Crisis Compliance and Fukushima
International organizations require guidelines for dealing with Technology Based
Risk. This paper presents a theoretically based framework--Crisis Compliance--for educating
individuals, organizations, and government leaders on how to approach a crisis and on how to
apply it to international organizations and industries. Crisis Compliance is defined as: 1) the
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development of methodologies and systems to prepare individuals, organizations and
government leaders to predict, prevent and prevail over crises, 2) the development of an
awareness of best practices currently available for combating crises, 3) the development of an
understanding of newly emerging technologies, their vulnerabilities that could make them
crisis prone, as well as their potential for combating crises, and 4) the development of an
understanding of the obligation of individuals, managers and government leaders to make use
of these best practices and technologies in an appropriate manner.
Crisis Compliance argues that if appropriate technologies are used and best practices
are followed, then individuals, organizations and governments will have fulfilled their
obligations to their stakeholders and will be free from unfair criticisms and potential lawsuits.
Crises are resulting in an increasing number of lawsuits resulting in large financial settlements
and even manslaughter convictions (Mitroff, 2005), (Lash & Wellington, 2007), (Associated
Press, 2012). Crisis Compliance neither guarantee that a crisis not will arise, nor and that no
negative impacts will not occur. Rather, it guarantees that organization and government
leaders have done everything humanly possible to predict the crisis, to prevent its
occurrence/mitigate negative impacts, to create a learning environment that will help prevail
over future crises, and to help restore the sense of well-being and the culture after the crisis
has passed.
Crisis Compliance draws on the theoretical perspectives of Perrow's Normal
Accident Theory, the Theory of High Reliability Organizations, and Lally's Target and Shield
Model. A case study of Fukushima will first place the disaster in the context of Crisis
Compliance. The study will then expand and extend the concept of Crisis Compliance and
examine the implications of these extensions for the future of the international nuclear
industry.
This study will 'address the following questions: 1) Was technology used
appropriately to prevent the Fukushima disaster? 2) Was technology used appropriately to
mitigate the damage? and 3) How can technology be used to prevent future disasters, help in
disaster recover, and help in the post-crisis renewal?
Frameworks for Studying Crises
Three theoretical frameworks provide a basis for international Crisis Compliance: 1)
Perrow's Normal Accident Theory, 2) the Theory of High Reliability Organizations and 3)
Lally's Target and Shield Model.
Normal Accident Theory (NAT)
The first theoretical perspective, which addresses the potential threats involved in large
scale systems is Charles Perrow's Normal Accident Theory (1984, 1999). Normal Accident
Theory (NAT) argues that the characteristics of a system's design make it more or less prone to
accidents. Perrow distinguishes between disastrous "accidents," which are system wide and
seriously impact the system's overall functioning and "incidents," which involve single failures
that can be contained within a limited area and which do not compromise the system's overall
functioning. Perrow argues that no system can be designed to completely avoid incidents, but
that inherent qualities of the system determine how far and how fast the damage will spread.
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Systems that are not designed to contain the negative impact of incidents will, therefore, be
subject to accidents in the course of their normalfunctioning.
The first key characteristic of accident prone systems is their complexity. NAT argues
that as systems become more complex, they become more accident prone. Perrow also notes
that the greatest source of complexity is often the external environment and that having a system
interact with the external environment is likely to cause a significant increase its complexity.
Perrow also identifies "common mode failures" in which a single incident can cause multiple
failures and notes these types of failures are a common source of accidents in complex systems.
Sargut and McGrath (2011) further distinguish between complicated systems, those
that have many parts which move in predictable ways, and complex systems, those with many
parts that move in ways that are continually changing:
"Three properties determine the complexity of an environment. The first
multiplicity refers to the number of potentially interacting elements. The
second interdependence refers to how interconnected those elements are.
The third diversity has to do with their degree of heterogeneity. The
greater the multiplicity, interdependence, and diversity, the greater the
complexity" (p 70).
NAT distinguishes a second characteristic of systems that exacerbate potential
problems brought about as a result of complexity -- tight coupling. Tight coupling means there
is no slack time or buffering of resources between tasks, and interactions happen immediately.
Tight coupling, like complexity, is often more efficient from a productivity standpoint.
However, incidents tend to propagate faster and their impact becomes more severe because there
is no lag time during which human intervention can occur and no buffer stocks to mitigate the
impact of downtime.
NAT distinguishes one further characteristic of disaster prone systems, a lack of
control. Tightly coupled, complex systems are difficult to understand, making potential
problems harder to predict. Controls that would sense problems and respond to them need to be
built into systems as they are developed, but rarely are due to economic and time constraints.
Perrow developed his theory while studying complex technologies such as nuclear
power plants, like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, where major disasters had happened,
consequently determining the conditions under which incidents such as valve failures could
lead to accidents such as nuclear meltdowns. NAT argues that human and technology based
incidents need to be anticipated and controls need to be built into the system to prevent them
and contain their propagation. The question as to whether nuclear power plants can be
designed to prevent future disasters, or whether their inherent characteristics make them
disaster prone, emerges from Perrow's work.
The Theory of High Reliability Organizations (HRO)
Researchers in High Reliability Organizations (HRO) have examined organizations
in which complex, tightly coupled, technologically based systems appeared to be coping
successfully with the potential for disaster. High reliability theorists' studies of the Federal
Aviation Administration's air traffic control system, the Pacific Gas and Electric's electric
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power system, and the peacetime flight operations of three United States Navy aircraft
carriers, indicate that organizations can achieve nearly error free operation (Roberts, 1989),
(La Porte & Consolini, 1991), (Sagan, 1993). (Klein, Bigely and Roberts, 1995), (Grabowski
and Roberts, 1997).
HRO theorists identify three critical causal factors for achieving reliability: 1) political
elites and organizational leaders put safety and reliability first, 2) the organization has high
levels of redundancy in personnel and technical safety measures, 3) the organization has a high
reliability culture, that involves sophisticated forms of trial and error learning.
The two theories have been contrasted as "pessimistic" -- NATs contention that
disaster is inevitable in badly designed systems, versus "optimistic" - HROs pragmatic
approach to achieving greater reliability. The theories, however, are in agreement as to which
characteristics of systems make them accident prone. This study will examine whether the
best practices advocated by HRO theory were implemented at Fukushima before, during, and
after the disaster.
Lally's Target and Shield Model
Lally (1996) argued that Normal Accident Theory was a sound theoretical
perspective for understanding the risks of technology, because technology is complex, tightly
coupled and often poorly controlled. She also argued (Lally, 1997) that technology based
systems do not operate in isolation but in organizational settings where failures in technology
can lead to more widespread secondary failures in organizations and to society as a whole.
Additionally, she argued (Lally, 2002) that the frequent rapid change in both technology
based systems and the work processes they support can further exacerbate the potential for
disaster.
Lally (2004) further extended the model and argued that technology based systems
are not only a target, used as a weapon of destruction to cause serious accidents, but also a
shield used to prevent damage from future incidents/whether they be caused by human error,
technology based, or from natural causes.
This "Target and Shield" conceptual model drew on insights from the Theory of
High Reliability Organizations and it suggests that technology designers and managers, as
well as government and law enforcement agencies learn from past experiences and embody
this knowledge in the design and implementation of future technology based systems. The
resulting systems should not only be more secure and resilient, but also be able to prevent
future technology based/physical attacks, and mitigate their impact should they occur.
The Target and Shield model incorporates Lally's extensions to Normal Accident
Theory. The model also contains three significantfeedback loops, which allow technology to
play a positive role in preventing future incidents from materializing, having real world
impacts, and limiting their impacts when they do occur. In Feedback Loop #1, Prevent
future incidents, controls can be built into the system to prevent future incidents from
materializing. In Feedback Loop #2, Prevent Propagation of Incidents, controls can be
built into the system to prevent future incidents that have materialized from turning into
accidents. In Feedback Loop #3, Mitigate Impact of Disasters, technology based systems
can be developed to prevent accidents resulting from technology based or physical attacks
from propagating even further, and to provide more rapid recovery and renewal of culture and
quality of life.
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Extensions of Crisis Compliance
Lally extended her Crisis Compliance framework to encompass: 1) Whether
technology is the Source, Prevention, or Cure of the Crisis, 2) Crises in Socially Diverse
Areas, 3) Unprecedented Crises, 4) Crises with Malevolent Causes, and 5) Post Crisis
These extensions allow the Crisis
Infrastructure Rebuilding and Cultural Renewal.
Compliance framework to encompass a wider range of disasters and raise additional issues for
the use of technology to predict, prevent and prevail over the crises.
Is Technology the Source of the Crisis, the Prevention, or the Cure?
Lally (2008) argues that an important characteristic of a crisis is the role of
technology-is it the source of the crisis, the prevention of the crisis or the cure? Lally
(2014) states that Y2K had its foundation in poor software design and the rapid expansion and
proliferation of technology, making technology the source of the crisis. However, technology
played a major role in solving the problem as well. Testing methodologies helped isolate
potential failures; the resulting improved methodologies, for developing and documenting
systems, lead to more robust systems in the future. Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake and
tsunami in Fukushima were natural disasters in their original form. However, the events at
Fukushima cascaded into a disaster where man made technology played a major role.
Technology methodologies that were already available, could have played a much more
successful role in combating the crisis than they did.
Extending the Model to Crises in Diverse Areas
An additional finding that emerged in the Post 9/11 environment was that disasters
can occur in large scale social environments such as cities and nations, rather than being
limited to just organizations. NAT and HRO, which were developed to prevent innocent
mistakes from propagating into system-wide disasters in organizational settings had to be
extended. Lally (2004a) addressed the challenges of extending the models to large diverse
environments, other than organizational settings. Large areas add additional layers of
complexity and tight coupling when compared to organizational settings. In organizational
settings, the shared mental models recommended by High Reliability Theory are easier to
enforce. Organizations can appoint professionals who are educated in preventing disasters
and involve all employees in disaster training. Murphy (2004) argued that terrorist attacks in
urban areas are likely to involve "a spectrum of trained professionals, cognitively and
physically fatigued individuals, motivated volunteers, and frightened victims" (Murphy, 2004,
p .2), making shared mental models harder to achieve and appropriate social interaction more
difficult. A heterogeneous environment, therefore, provides additional challenges in a crisis.
Sargut and McGrath's (2011) complexity model also encompasses diversity as another factor
that increases complexity.
The complex, tightly coupled infrastructure of large urban areas makes fault
isolation and system restoration more difficult to achieve, exemplified by the blackout of
8/14/03 and Hurricane Irene. IT based initiatives for combating terrorism must address these
new challenges as well. Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2011) indicate that achieving good
crisis communication and disaster response was much simpler in Oklahoma City after the
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bombing, than in New York after 9/11, because the culture was more homogeneous.
The Fukushima disaster caused radiation leaks that spread throughout large portions
of Japan due to radioactive exposure extending beyond the geographical boundaries of Japan.
Although Japan has a relatively homogenous, law abiding culture, the global ramifications of
nuclear disasters across widely diverse populations must be considered when deploying
nuclear power technology.
Unprecedented Crises Pose Greater Challenges
Another characteristic of crises that adds to the potential for damage is whether or
not they are unprecedented. Lally (2014) argues that Y2K had no precedent, making the
challenge of understanding the problem, even by experts, more challenging. Maintaining
information transparence with the public also became a greater challenge, since the potential
consequences of the problem were not readily determinable.
Crises such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina were not beyond imagination but were
unprecedented on the scale at which they occurred (Lally, 2006), (Lally & Garbushian, 2007).
Despite 130 years of technological advances, civil reform, and building code updates, the
Fukushima disaster resulted in 20,000 deaths and a major nuclear accident whose impacts are
still being calculated (Katayama, 2011).
As a result of a crisis being unprecedented, there was no collection of best practices
to draw on. Developing a theoretical model that allows crisis managers to draw on best
practices from cases that are without precedent, but share similar characteristics, will help
prevail over an unprecedented crisis. A careful post crisis analysis will reveal additional best
practices and establish precedents for future crises.
The Challenge of Malevolent Threats
Another characteristic of crises is whether they are the result of malevolent actions.
Y2K was caused by an inadvertent error by program designers. The result of extensive Y2K
testing has led to better software design. Lally (2004) argues that 9/11, in contrast, was
malevolent and preventing the reoccurrence of another major terrorist attack involves
investigating groups of individuals who may or may not be guilty with serious implications
for privacy and civil rights. When a recent Germanwings air disaster was determined to have
been deliberately caused by the co-pilot, a different model of the role of technology's use in
preventing the disaster emerged. The focus now centered on gathering information about the
psychological state and the intentions of the operator of the airplanes, rather than the
technology of the airplanes themselves (Kulish, Eddy and Gray, 2015). Fukushima was not
malicious, because even the harshest critics of the government's policy don't suggest that
anyone wanted it to happen.
However, a nuclear power plant disaster could be caused by malevolent individuals
with inside information about the plant's operations and/or with weapons such as bombs or
hijacked airplanes. The impact of these attacks could hypothetically be much worse than
those experienced at Fukushima and are well within the realm of human imagination.
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Post-Crisis Renewal: Rebuilding Infrastructure and Restoring Culture
Lally (2013) argued that in the wake of natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina
and Sandy, technology provides several technological and methodological solutions to
recover from the disaster and to build a more resilient environment in the future. She argues
that stakeholders must make informed decisions about the feasibility of available solutions.
Individual stakeholders in the Post-Crisis environment must make informed decisions
between rebuilding in the same areas or relocating elsewhere.
Lally (2008) also argued that technology can be the source of Post Crisis recovery
and renewal. She cited examples of how survivors of Hurricane Katrina used the Internet to
locate friends and relatives and to create support groups among geographically disbursed
survivors. Lally and Ahad (2009) applied her model to survivors of the wars in Afghanistan.
She conducted a study that indicated that individuals exposed to positive multimedia images
of the beauties, rather than the tragedies of Afghan culture were more likely to support nonmilitary aid. The use of technology as a force in Post Crisis Renewal appears to be affected
by the strength of the affected culture and by the number of positive images, sounds and other
sensations associated with the pre-disaster culture. Japan's long and rich cultural heritage
should provide a great source of Post Crisis renewal in the Post Fukushima environment.
Characterizing Fukushima in terms of Crisis Compliance
Fukushima can be characterized in terms of the Crisis Compliance framework to
provide a foundation for understanding its emerging implications that extend the models.
The Fukushima disaster began in March of 2011 when a major earthquake hit
Northeastern Japan, causing a major tsunami. (Lochbaum, Lyman, Stranahan, 2014). Sensors
throughout Japan indicated that an earthquake was imminent and alerted the Fukushima
Daiichi plant. The plant responded to the earthquake with a "by the book scram" shutdown,
coping successfully with this more anticipated and planned for event.
However, the tsunami resulting from the earthquake overflowed the restraining wall
and flooded the plant, damaging all reactors and disabling both regular and backup power
sources. This is an example of the "common mode" failure Perrow warned about. Not only
were primary systems disabled, but also all backup systems and safety indicators in the
control room-which was left completely in darkness. The quick, courageous and innovative
responses of the plant's managers and workers created rigged solutions that prevented the
impacts of the disaster from being even worse than it could have been. However, the damage
to the plant resulted in a nuclear meltdown and radiation release whose impacts are still being
measured. In addition to nearly 20,000 people being killed by the earthquake and tsunami,
millions of people had to be relocated, including several entire villages. Increased levels of
radiation have been detected as far away as California.
In terms of Normal Accident Theory, the original disasters of the earthquake and
tsunami, like Hurricane Katrina, were natural in origin and were predictable in advance.
Unlike Hurricane Katrina, the natural disaster, was greatly compounded by the impact of the
tsunami on the complex, tightly coupled technology of the Fukushima nuclear power plant,
creating a new kind of disaster. As a result, the Fukushima Nuclear Independent
Investigation Commission called the events at Fukushima "a profoundly man-made disaster"
(Tabachi, 2012, p. 1) that could have been foreseen and prevented. The disaster was
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described as a "special event," that had "never been envisioned," that was "beyond the
procedure manual," and "beyond what we trained for," by the workers at the Daiichi plant
(NOVA, 2015).
In accordance with High Reliability Organization theory, procedures were in place
for coping with the earthquake but they may not have been sufficient given its strength. The
combination of the earthquake and tsunami was not planned for, although there was
significant historical precedent of earthquakes giving rise to tsunamis. The scale of the
tsunami was also beyond the scope planned for, and procedures for preventing and
responding to blackouts due to mass flooding was not well thought out. Once major damage
had occurred and a meltdown had begun, Fukushima also lacked the methodologies for
coping with an extreme emergency. The Japanese government also failed in its obligation to
alert the public and address the crisis.
In terms of the Target and Shield Model, the Fukushima disaster failures caused by
the earthquakes and tsunami propagated into a nuclear meltdown with widespread societal
and economic impacts. In terms of using technology to mitigate the disaster, the power
failure left most technology based solutions unworkable, "We were facing an unseen enemy,"
armed only with a "broken safety culture" (NOVA, 2015). Like 9/11, this disaster that was
not unimaginable but was considered so unlikely that a detailed response had not been
crafted. Its occurrence had changed the rules of disaster response.
With regards to the three feedback loops, all aspects of preventing future disasters:
1) predicting and preventing future incidents, 2) preventing propagation of incidents and 3)
mitigating the impact of future disasters, must be addressed. Lally (2008) argued that after
9/11 a number of technological innovations for detecting potential terrorist threats and
assisting first responders were developed that have already found additional applications in
other crisis scenarios. Lally (2013) also argued that regions that survived Hurricane Sandy
had a number of hurricane mitigation technologies to choose from that were already
functioning in areas such as the Netherlands.
30 out of 100 nuclear plants currently active in the U.S. are built on the same design
as Fukushima. $2 billion have been dedicated to develop new safety technologies and
methodologies (Halpern, Channon, and Wald, 2014). The success or the failure (Saito,
Takenaka, and Topham, 2013) of these technologies can provide insight into the need for
enhanced safety practices required to make nuclear energy viable. However, technological
solutions developed and implemented thus far at Fukushima have met with limited success,
with Japanese auditors reporting that a third of the $1.6 billion in taxpayer money has been
wasted. A "lack of transparency" in the process of choosing contractors to develop
containment and cleanup technologies was held partly to be blamed (Associated Press, 2015).
Five years after the disaster, contaminated water continues to flow from the site into
the ocean, and "the technology to scoop melted fuel out of the damaged reactors doesn't even
exist yet" (Featherstone, 2016, p. 2). Chief decommissioning Officer Naohiro Masuda still
reports that "At Fukushima Daiichi, there's no textbook" (Featherstone, 2016, p. 1).
There are several parallels that emerge when comparing Fukushima, Y2K, 9/11, and
Hurricane Katrina (Brinkley, 2006), (Lally, 2006), (Lally & Garbushian, 2007). For example,
similar to Y2K when it was first discovered, the dimensions of the disaster were
"unknowable". However, unlike Y2K, which had a clear deadline, the Fukushima disaster
resulted in some areas of the nuclear plant being radioactive till date and it still cannot be
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examined to discover the exact sequence in which the disaster occurred, or the full extent of
the damage.
Like Hurricane Katrina, both crises occurred in affluent, well-educated countries
with experts available who were able to (and often did) address these issues before the
disasters occurred (Van Heerden, 2006). In both cases, information from top down sources
was ignored by decision makers, and information from bottom up sources before the disaster
was unavailable to stakeholders. Unlike Hurricane Katrina, which was a natural disaster,
Fukushima was a cascading disaster that involved a pair of natural disasters evolving into a
technological one.
As in the case of 9/11, the Fukushima disaster required a massive cleanup effort. In
both cases, the cleanup effort involved exposing workers to a toxic environment whose
negative health impacts were stochastic-not manifesting until later, and not in a uniform
way across the population of exposed workers. At Fukushima, a $5 million device, that uses
X-ray like technology to locate molten fuel debris without exposing workers to radiation, is
not yet operational (Associated Press, 2015a). Determining the degree of information
transparency, versus concealed risk the workers faced when deciding to join the cleanup
effort, are key issues for any massive cleanup effort in a toxic environment. Unlike 9/11,
where cleanup workers were characterized as heroes (DePalma, 2011), Japanese cleanup
workers are stigmatized as being contaminated by their exposure to radiation (Chao and
Barnett, 2012), (Tabachi, 2014). Radiation contamination will leave whole communities
uninhabitable for at least 40 years and require new and innovative methodologies to
decommission the plant.
Going forward, what are the obligations of organizations and governments to their
stakeholders to address problems that are identifiable and fixable before disasters occur? If
the timeline of the crisis is set from the moment the tsunami hit, the responses of the plant
workers to an out-of-the-box disaster were admirable and resulted in minimizing the impact
of a terrible situation. However, decisions about the future of the nuclear power industry
must be made in terms of the game changing events at Fukushima. Are individuals,
organizations and governments being given complete information in addressing these
important decisions, or, is information being withheld, making optimal decisions less
possible? What additional information do stakeholders require before deciding to move near
a nuclear power plant? Is nuclear power so inherently unsafe and the impacts of disasters so
devastating, that the technology is not viable?
Extending Dimensions of Crisis Compliance in the Wake of Fukushima
An analysis of the Fukushima disaster raises a number of emerging aspects of Crisis
Compliance. They include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

"Design Basis" versus "Beyond Design Basis" risks.
Deterministic versus Stochastic Risks
Physical and Geographic Scope
Contained versus Cascading Disasters
Internal versus External Locus of Control
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"Beyond Design Basis" Risks
Two additional concepts emerge from a study of Fukushima that are essential for
understanding the degree of risk in a scenario characterized by complex technology. The
concepts are "Design Basis" and "Beyond Design Basis" and can be applied to any complex
technology based system. Design Basis Risks are those that can be, to a reasonable degree,
expected to occur with a given technology, and therefore, must be taken into account in their
design and manufacturing by vendors. Examples include flat tires on cars and trash fires in
large buildings. Designers of these systems are expected to address these anticipated risks
with coping technologies and methodologies to prevent their occurrence and minimize their
impact.
Beyond Design Basis risks are those "out of the box" risks that lie outside the realm
of what can reasonably be expected to occur. Due to their unexpected nature, they have no
clear precedents from which best practices can be drawn and no immediate technological or
methodological solutions. Disaster response becomes a much more challenging problem.
Y2K and 9/11 can be clearly characterized as "beyond design basis" disasters at the time of
their occurrence, because they had no clear precedent at the time they occurred. However,
because of these disasters, expanded definitions of "design basis" risks emerged and required
new technological and procedural methodologies for responding to these classes of crises.
New disasters make future disasters more foreseeable.
Manufacturers of complex
technologies can no longer cling to overly optimistic definitions of Design Basis Risks when
confronted with the actual consequences of risks that have already materialized.
Issues that emerge include: 1) Whether the definition of "design basis accidents"
applied in the Japanese nuclear power industry was realistic, given the knowledge available at
the time of the Fukushima disaster, 2) How the events resulting from the tsunami at
Fukushima have expanded the concept of "design basis accidents" in the nuclear power
industry, and 3) How Crisis Compliant power plants must respond in the future. Other recent
examples of overly optimistic definitions of "design basis accidents," include the December
2013 Amtrak train wreck in upstate New York, and the 2016 crash of a commuter train in
Hoboken, where a fatal accident occurred, despite the availability of technology to remotely
stop the train (McGeehan, Rosenberg, and Fitzsimmons, 2016).
Deterministic versus Stochastic Risks
Another major distinction in risk analysis hinges on whether the negative outcome is
virtually guaranteed to happen once the disaster has occurred and whether it is visible and
measurable when it happens. If so, the risk is called "deterministic." With deterministic risk,
the outcomes are observable and the negative outcome follows a clear path of causality within
in an observable time frame. An example of deterministic risks would be a homeowner
having an icy sidewalk and a passerby falling and breaking his ankle.
The second class of risk is called "stochastic risk." In stochastic risk, the negative
results do not automatically follow in a clear causal sequence. They may take years to
emerge, or may not manifest at all. In this case, the icy sidewalk is still there but no one has
fallen on it yet. Other examples include the impact of smoking on cancer, and the impact of
exposure to dust (during the cleanup of Ground Zero after 9/11) on emphysema among
cleanup workers. Attributing causality and the resulting liability in these scenarios is much
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more problematic. Much time and energy can be spent on investigations to prove who is
responsible, who has been victimized, and how much the injured parties can recover.
In the case of nuclear power, when radiation exposure exceeds a threshold value,
usually in the tens to hundreds of rems, the results are deterministic. The radiation kills cells
and damages organs causing "acute radiation syndrome," resulting in death. The impacts of
severe exposure to radiation over a short period of time are, therefore, deterministic.
When the radiation exposure is below the threshold value, the risks of the exposure
are definitively stochastic. The radiation does not definitively cause the exposed individual
to immediately experience illness or death. Therefore, the link between exposure and illness
is not as clear in terms of causality. Other factors can come into play such as the individual's
lifestyle or pre-existing conditions that may impact the individual's response to the exposure
and resulting longevity. Exposure to radiation, or to the dust at ground zero after 9/11, or the
prolonged effects of alcohol and tobacco are other examples of factors that gave rise to
impacts that have been debated because of their non-deterministic nature.
At Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, debate continues over the long term impact of
the radiation released by the accidents, and its impact on public health and the future of
nuclear power. Japan is currently struggling with the issue of studying the impacts of
Fukushima's fallout on exposed populations (McNeill, 2014). A key emerging issue is the
obligation of governments to disseminate information regarding deterministic and stochastic
impacts of nuclear risk factors to allow individuals to make informed choices about the
radiation risk they now face, and to choose among alternative energy sources in the future
Crises and Physical Geographic Scope
Another characteristic of crises is their physical geographic scope. 9/11 was a major
disaster in terms of loss of life and property, and was due to malevolent causes. However, the
physical damage was limited to several square miles. Physical and Geographic scope
addresses whether the crises can be controlled by quarantining the area, and whether the
effects of the crisis spread quickly beyond its original geographic boundaries. Sites like
Chernobyl were remote and were able to be quarantined, resulting in limited impact outside
the affected area. Quarantining and evacuating a densely populated area such as Japan
presented far greater challenges. The March, 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster in Japan
posed serious threats to the people of Tokyo, and resulted in nuclear radiation increases in
California. Four years later, trace amounts of radiation from the disaster are still being
reported in Canada (Reuters, 2015).
Contained versus Cascading Disasters
Disasters can not only happen in one isolated time and place, but also may lead to
other disasters of a different nature that occur at separate locations, at separate times, and
give rise to their own consequences. These disaster trails can be explained in terms of the
Target and Shield Model, where isolated failures, unless contained, give rise to system wide
and even global risks. In Japan, the earthquake and tsunami were disasters in their own right.
The death toll for these disasters was over 15,000 with massive destruction of property and
displacement of entire communities. It was against this backdrop that the nuclear meltdown
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took place. Although cascading disasters need to be analyzed individually, their interactive
and compound effects result in even more devastating consequences.
In recent financial history, the failure of the U.S. sub-prime housing market
contributed to a number of other business and financial failures with wide ranging negative
social consequences. If disasters are not contained, they often give rise to financial crises,
epidemics, and population relocations that have enduring repercussions. Understanding the
relationships between cascading disasters is important in containing their impact. Creating
buffers to protect essential assets from the indirect impact of disasters beyond a given
individual's, organization's or government's sphere of control is another key aspect of crisis
compliance. The question arises as to how wide the span of control a Crisis Compliant
organization can have to protect itself against cascading disasters.
Internal versus External Locus of Control
Crisis Compliance argues that organizations and governments must take
responsibility for their own crises, based upon an active examination of the risks in the
environment.
Compliant organizations cannot rely on external agencies, customer
complaints, or actual disasters to make them aware of problems. When organizations become
too closely allied with their regulatory agencies, a moral hazard is created, permitting
governing agencies and affected organizations to collaborate in creating more limiting
regulations. In Japan, the relationship between TEPCO and the NRC permitted limited
definitions of "beyond design basis" accidents, which limited the preparedness needed at
Fukushima. Organizations that: take an adversarial attitude toward complaints, hoping for the
best, and respond with improved technologies and methodologies, only when legally
necessary, are not Crisis Compliant. Compliant organizations cannot pursue a passive policy
of responding only to external forces; they must enforce an active anti-disaster policy of their
own.
Conclusion: Crisis Compliance Post Fukushima
This paper has presented a theoretically based framework for characterizing IT
based threats and opportunities. A twelve-part framework of key characteristics of crises
emerged. Characteristics with an asterisk have emerged from the present analysis.
1.
Is the crisis on an individual, organizational, or global level?
2.
Are technology based systems the target of the threat and/or can
technology be used to combat the threat?
3.
Is the crisis occurring across a heterogeneous population or one with a
common culture and language?
4.
Is the crisis unprecedented? What can we learn from best practices in
dealing with previous crises?
5.
Is the crisis being caused deliberately by malevolent people or a result of
an inadvertent error or natural disaster?
6.
What technology based solutions are currently feasible, and to what degree
are individuals, organizations and government leaders obliged to use them?
What are the ethical and legal implications of not using them?
7.
*Is the crisis "beyond design basis" for the technology involved?
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8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

*What are the deterministic versus the stochastic risks of negative
outcomes?
*Can we contain the physical geographic scope of the crisis? How far and
how fast can it spread?
*Is the crisis of a single type (natural disaster or technological failure) or
are cascading disasters involved?
*Is the current crisis environment characterized by internal or external
control?
What are the long term impacts of the crisis and how can technology help
restore the quality of life and culture once the crisis has passed?

In terms of the original Crisis Compliance framework, Fukushima was a textbook
Normal Accident scenario--a complex, tightly coupled system, which experienced fatal
common mode failures that resulted in a loss of control. In terms of HRO, the failure of
imagination in envisioning the source and severity of the crisis made existing crisis response
methodologies inadequate. Likewise, the technology based methodologies for mitigating the
impact of the disaster were crippled by the common mode failures that caused the blackout.
All the emerging crisis characteristics make nuclear power more disaster prone.
Fukushima, quickly propagated into a "beyond design basis" crisis making existing
procedures inadequate. The radiation leaks resulting from the disaster had serious stochastic
implications for the health of individuals exposed. Radiation leaks were difficult to contain
geographically. The Fukushima event was a cascading disaster, where one disaster evolved
into another, each exacerbating the impacts of the others. There are major concerns about
who should regulate the nuclear power industry. These critical factors all point to a
reconsideration of the decision to use nuclear power. Future research will address the key
issue that emerges from analysis: Crisis Compliance needs to encompass making an informed
and transparent decision about the potential risks involved in creating or entering a disaster
prone scenario in the first place.
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